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Abstract: In this article, I question the plausibility of Metz’s
African moral theory from an oft neglected moral topic of partial-
ity. Metz defends an Afro-communitarian moral theory that posits
that the rightness of actions is entirely definable by relationships
of identity and solidarity (or, friendship). I offer two objections to
this relational moral theory. First, I argue that justifying partiality
strictly by invoking relationships (of friendship) ultimately fails to
properly value the individual for her own sake – this is called the
‘focus problem’ in the literature. Second, I argue that a relation-
ship-based theory cannot accommodate the agent-related partiality
since it posits some relationship to be morally fundamental. My
critique ultimately reveals the inadequacy of a relationship-based
moral theory insofar as it overlooks some crucial moral consider-
ations grounded on the individual herself in her own right. 
Keywords: agent-related partiality, deontology, focus problem,
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Thad Metz (2007a) in his ground breaking article ‘Towards an
African Moral Theory’ defends an African relational moral theory.1
By ‘moral theory’ he refers to a principle of right action or ‘norma-
tive theorisation’, which involves invoking a norm, some basic value
like utility or dignity, in virtue of which one can differentiate
between (what all) right and/or wrong actions have in common
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(321). His normative theory is ‘relational’, as opposed to individu-
alist,2 insofar as it ultimately accounts for right actions purely in
terms of a property that is external to a human individual. Metz’s
moral theory singles out some relationships, harmonious ones, as
bearers of intrinsic value (331). Metz argues that the relational char-
acter of his moral theory renders it relevantly African. And, when it
is compared to extant (individualistic) attempts to capture African
ethics, Metz considers his account to be (more) plausible insofar as
it best captures moral intuitions prevalent below the Sahara.3 In this
article, I question the plausibility of Metz’s relational moral theory.
I make two objections to this relational moral theory. First, I
object that a relationship-based moral theory will have counterintu-
itive implications with regard to what we should ultimately care
about, the relationship in which the individual is in or the individual
herself in the relationship. This, in the literature, is called the ‘wrong
focus’ objection since a relationship view will insist that we ought
to focus on the relationship rather than the individual for her own
sake (Lord 2016: 574). The question of whether we focus on the
individual or relationship is crucial given that Metz draws a strict
distinction about where ultimately to locate moral value: on factors
internal (individualism) or external (of) an individual (relational-
ism). Second, it strikes me that this theory is unable to accord pri-
mary consideration to agent-related partiality: the idea that an
individual has some primary duties to herself-self-regarding duties-
that may at times override other-regarding considerations. This
objection strikes me as plausible given that Metz insists that right
actions are determined solely by some facets of interpersonal rela-
tionships and not by facts about the individual in the relationship
itself. All these criticisms will indicate that a monistic relationship-
based moral theory will not be able to accommodate the considera-
tion that morality, to some extent, is about me and my life-plan as an
individual, without slipping into moral egoism; but represents part
of what it means to lead a robust moral life.4
I criticise Metz’s moral theory because it is arguably one of the
most influential attempts to theorise African ethics qua ubuntu in
African philosophy. Furthermore, I am aware that this theory has
been criticised for several reasons. I find at least three major criti-
cisms against this moral theory in the literature. First, there is a
complaint that Metz’s moral theory is not African or fails to under-
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stand what is distinctive about African ethics (Ramose 2007: 348–
355). Second, there is a concern about cross-cultural differences in
moral thinking relative to concerns that ‘we cannot coherently act
or reason at all about what to do or think without presupposing that
there are objectively good reasons, we should not abandon that pre-
supposition’ (Wood 2007: 338). At the heart of this concern is that
we should not be content with merely presenting some account as
an ‘African’ moral theory. Instead, we should aspire for objective
moral truths, which, in turn, should influence our cross-cultural the-
oretical engagements, so that we come as close as possible to objec-
tive moral truths transcending the effects of our geography and its
impact on our perception of moral truths. Lastly, there are two inter-
esting attempts to defend a perfectionist ethics as at least as plausi-
ble as Metz’s relationship theory (Lutz 2009: 313–328; van Niekerk
2007: 365–368). This last criticism comes close to my preferred
interpretation of African ethics insofar as it favours some individu-
alistic interpretation of African ethics, but this also falls short
because it does not show what is internally problematic about
grounding the entire moral gamut on some relationship. 
What, however, I find missing in the literature is a criticism that
goes to the DNA of Metz’s moral theory, namely: a criticism that
demonstrates the inadequacy of grounding the entire edifice of
morality in some kind of relationship. This article problematises the
DNA of Metz’s relational theory by distinctively evaluating this the-
ory in light of the ethical idea of partiality, more specifically agent-
related partiality, which is largely ignored in the literature in African
ethics (Molefe, 2016a/b). ‘Partiality’ is the moral idea that sanctions
favouritism in morality specifically in our special relationships like
family and friends (Cottingham 1983; Lord 2016). ‘Agent-related
partiality’ refers to the agent prioritizing herself and her own pro-
jects (Cottingham 1991). Agent-related partiality points to a moral-
ity that is agent-centred. In Greek moral thought, the virtue of
temperance, for example, is an agent-centred consideration since it
is concerned about a self and its good (Metz 2012a). The critique
here against Metz’s theory, ultimately, is: it is not clear how a moral
theory that accounts for a right action in terms of relationships with
others can prioritise agent-centred considerations for their own sake.
This critique will succeed supposing I am correct that Metz’s the-
ory is rightly construed as strictly relational, that is, it is a monistic
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theory that considers some relationships to be entirely doing the job
of accounting for right and wrong, and other factors, whatever they
may be, are simply secondary.5 I am convinced that this is the best
way to read Metz, but anyone who may read him differently will not
be convinced by this article. Furthermore, it is crucial that the reader
notes that I limit my critique to Metz’s article as cited above and
other progressions of it in related articles that bear the feature of
relationality as the mark of his moral theory (Metz 2007b, 2009,
2013a, 2013b).
For purposes of going to the heart of this theory, I structure this
article in the following fashion. First, I present Metz’s African moral
theory. In the second section, I proceed to offer the criticisms men-
tioned above: the focus problem and agent-related partiality objection. 
Metz’s Moral Theory
In his article, Metz seeks to defend a plausible principle of right
action (321). To do so, he needs to invoke a norm with an ‘African
pedigree’ (324). This norm will do the job of distinguishing ‘what
all permissible acts have in common as distinct from impermissible
ones’ (321). Metz notices a crucial distinction between norms that
capture values that are ‘individualistic’ and those that are ‘commu-
nitarian’ (331). ‘Individualistic’ norms are those that ultimately
ground morality on some internal feature of an individual, specifi-
cally dignity, life, utility and perfection (329–330; see also Metz
2013a: 78). ‘Communitarian’ norms are those that locate it on some
external feature like a relationship, specifically survival or harmony
(331–332). Metz ultimately grounds his theory of right action on a
communitarian norm of harmony. 
Metz favours the norm of harmony precisely because it promises
to capture ‘properly communitarian renditions of Ubuntu’ (331).
By ‘properly communitarian’ he means that his theory is congruent
with an emphasis on relationships and/or community as a distinctive
feature that characterises African moral thought (Gyekye 1992: 101;
Menkiti 1984: 171; Wiredu 2008: 332). On this communitarian
moral theory, a right action is a function of prizing some interper-
sonal relationships. This should come as no surprise given that Metz
searches for an African moral theory by surveying the literature on
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the notion of ubuntu, which is saliently considered to be at the heart
of African moral thought, particularly among the Bantu people,
among others (Eze 2005; Ramose 1999; Shutte 2001). The idea of
ubuntu is generally captured by the following maxim: ‘a person is a
person through other persons’.
I submit that two facts may be gleaned from this maxim ‘a person
is a person through other persons’. First, moral personhood is a
function purely of some relationship, that is, to achieve moral excel-
lence or to practise virtue, I need to be engaged in some kind of
relationships with others (Gaie and Metz 2010: 275; Gyekye 1992:
118; Menkiti 1984: 172). By implication, the possibility ‘to become
a full person, a real self, or a genuine human being, i.e., to exhibit
virtue in a way that not everyone ends up doing’ is impossible in the
absence of others (Metz 2010: 83, emphasis added). Second, Metz
specifies that harmonious relationships are the only way to achieve
the end of being a good person (Gaie and Metz 2010: 275). It is for
this reason that Metz observes that this account of ubuntu ‘posits
certain relationships as constitutive of the good that a moral agent
ought to promote’ (334). Thus, it is correct to observe that ubuntu
as a moral theory is relational insofar as it grounds morality on the
external property of certain relationships. It is therefore urgent that
we be specific about what kinds of relationships constitute the
whole gamut of morality in an African tradition.
To specify and clarify which relations are of the relevant moral
kind, Metz draws from Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu, who is
famous for chairing the South African Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission (TRC). Tutu opining on the idea of ubuntu states: ‘Harmony,
friendliness, community are great goods. Social harmony is for us the
summum bonum – the greatest good’ (1999: 35). Here, Tutu unequiv-
ocally submits that harmony is the greatest good. Harmony is consid-
ered to be the ground-norm that defines right actions or it is
considered to be intrinsically good. In line with Tutu’s adumbrations
on ubuntu and how it posits harmony as the greatest good, Metz also
asserts that harmonious relationships are the sorts of relations that are
constitutive of the principle of right action (2010: 84). In other words,
if one wants to ascertain what constitutes a right action then one has
to rely solely on the basic value of harmony (Metz 2007b; 2009). 
According to Metz, the idea of harmony is best construed in
terms of two distinct relationships: those of identity and solidarity.
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By ‘identity’ he means ‘sharing of a way of life’ in which a person
sees herself as part of a social group, wherein she defines herself in
terms of ‘we’ rather than ‘I’; she shares in that group’s practices
and goals by taking part in coordinating projects to achieve those
shared ends (Metz 2007a: 335; 2009: 52). By ‘solidarity’ he has in
mind ‘caring and supporting relationships’, ones in which people
help one another, are affectionate towards one another and empa-
thetic (335–336). With this understanding of harmonious relation-
ships, we arrive at this principle of right action: ‘an action is right
just insofar as it is a way of living harmoniously or prizing commu-
nal relationships, ones in which people identify with each other and
exhibit solidarity with one another; otherwise, an action is wrong’
(Metz 2009: 51).6
This principle specifies that right actions are a function of prizing
com munal relationships and wrong ones are a function of disrespect-
ing such relationships. Right actions are a function of respecting
some interpersonal relationships where we share a way of life and
take care of those with whom we share a way of life. Or, as Metz
states: ‘So, it also follows that the present moral theory can be under-
stood to instruct an agent to respect or honor friendly relationships’
(Metz 2009: 54; 2010: 84). It should be emphasised that Metz’s
principle is deontological as it requires us to prize or honour some
relationships as opposed to promoting them, as a consequentialist
theory would prescribe (MacNaughton and Rawling 1992).7 It is also
interesting to note that Metz thinks that his way of construing ‘har-
mony’ in terms of identity and solidarity translates harmony into a
broad sense of ‘love’ or an ethics that prizes ‘friendship’ (337). 
It is also crucial to note that Metz informs us that a moral theory
that grounds moral normativity in ‘friendship’ or a broad sense of
‘love’ can reasonably be conceived to be partialist, that is it accords
prior and extra moral considerations to our loved ones and extant
relations over strangers and new relationships (Metz 2009: 52). This
implies that we have a duty to respect relationships of identity and
solidarity wherever possible, but our priority should be to our extant
special relationships. 
Above, I have given the reader what I consider to be as close as
possible an understanding of Metz’s deontological moral theory. We
observed that this theory posits harmonious interpersonal relation-
ships as fundamentally valuable. We also observed that ‘harmony’
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is constituted by relations of identity and solidarity; and, our deontic
obligation is to respect or honour relationships of identity and soli-
darity. In what follows, I turn to criticise Metz’s theory.
Relational Ethics and the Focus Problem
The literature in African ethics has tended to neglect considering
whether African ethics is best construed in terms of partiality or
impartiality (Molefe, 2016a/b). Elsewhere, I have argued that
African ethics is best represented in terms of partialism rather than
impartialism (Molefe, 2016b, 2018). Interestingly, Metz thinks that
African ethics is best construed in terms of partiality, though he
does not necessarily defend this claim (Metz 2009, 2010). For
example, Bell and Metz, comparing Chinese and African ethics,
note that they have these features in common: ‘We focus in this
article on three key precepts shared by Confucianism and Ubuntu:
the central value of community, the desirability of ethical partiality,
and the idea that we tend to become morally better as we grow
older’ (2011: 80; emphasis added). Generally, the literature con-
cerned about partiality usually justifies it by appeal to three sorts
of considerations, namely: projects, individuals and relationships
(Lord 2016). I am here not interested in delving into the details of
each of these moral-theoretical justifications of partiality; I limit
myself to the relationship-based justification and objections against
it since I believe they will equally apply to Metz’s relational theory. 
One way of justifying that we have greater or special duties to
our personal ties like family and friends is usually supported by
invoking the idea of relationships. ‘The relationships view holds
that facts about our relationships provide reasons to be partial. These
reasons are often weighty enough to justify partiality’ (Lord 2016:
570).8 The parent–child relationship, on this view, is ground enough
for me to show differential concern towards my daughter than to a
child of a stranger. For example, if I hear screams in a nearby river
and upon coming closer I see two persons drowning, if one of them
starts calling me by name, soon I realise it is my daughter. Accord-
ing to this view, the parent–child relationship is ground enough for
me to save my child, supposing I can only save one. The rationale
informing my prioritizing my child over a stranger, if a relationship-
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based partiality account is true, is the mere fact of the relationship
itself – she is my daughter. 
Though justifying partiality by appeal to relationships strikes the
intuitive chord of many, it has a serious limitation. One such limita-
tion is referred to as the ‘focus problem’ objection (Lord 2016:
572). Following the case of my drowning child in a river, what rea-
sons ought to justify or inform why I prioritise my daughter rather
than the other child? Will my reasons be informed by considerations
about her as an individual, like her soul/welfare/rights or should I
be drawn merely by the fact that she is my daughter (parent–child
relationship)? If I have to reflect on the reasons that inform my
choice, what facts ought to take priority in terms of my focus: indi-
vidual-based or relationship-based facts? This strict dichotomy
makes sense supposing one accounts for partiality strictly in terms
of relationships, wherein one considers them to be fundamentally
valuable as does Metz and other scholars (Scheffler 1995). 
A strictly relational ethics will surely have to invoke considera-
tions taken to be fundamental in terms of justifying partiality, which
are facts about the relationship itself. The objection against appeal-
ing solely to facts about relationships as a basis for justifying par-
tiality is that it is ‘very odd to think about which relationships we
have with things when thinking about what to do … it would be
inappropriate for me to focus on the fact that my relationship with
my (child) would be damaged if (s)he was badly injured. I shouldn’t
be primarily thinking about our relationship. I should be thinking
about her’ (Lord 2016: 571). The point is that relationship-based
accounts appear unable to focus on the individual qua individual. In
situations wherein my daughter is in danger, I should not primarily
be thinking about the parent–child relationship itself at least not as
a priority; instead, I should be focused on my daughter herself as an
individual and her threatened welfare. Other considerations should
naturally be in the background but should never eclipse the individ-
ual herself. If the individual, my daughter, and some facts about her
like her welfare do not take centre stage, this leaves the unfortunate
impression that the parent ‘cares less for you yourself than for a
role that he wants you to fill’ (Keller 2013: 63; emphasis added).
So, at the heart of this criticism is the question about what facts
should inform our reasons for prioritising our loved ones and, quite
naturally, a relationship-based view will invoke considerations riv-
60 Motsamai Molefe
eted on facts about the relationship itself. Given the fact that a rela-
tionship-based justification of partiality considers relationships to
be so fundamentally valuable that they ground partiality to our loved
ones, it follows that our focus should be on the fact of our relation-
ship with the individual and not the individual herself; hence, the
focus problem. My criticism to Metz’s theory expresses this con-
cern about the lack of proper focus on the individual herself.
The reader should remember that Metz considers relationships of
identity and solidarity to be morally fundamental in accounting for
a right action. These two facets of harmonious relationships, which
the agent is to prize or honour, throw her into a relationship with
others. Metz is unambiguous in this regard about where ultimately
to locate moral value: ‘A different understanding of the morality of
ubuntu includes the idea that moral value fundamentally lies not in
the individual, but rather in a relationship between individuals’
(333; emphasis added). So, there is no question that Metz distin-
guishes between individual-based and relationship-based consider-
ations; and, he considers the latter to be decisive for capturing
African ethics. 
Second, there is no question that Metz considers relationship-
based con siderations to be morally fundamental and prior to indi-
vidual-based consid erations – so much so that one accounts for
morality solely in terms of relationship-based considerations. It is
also crucial for the reader to bear in mind that Metz is ultimately
after a monistic moral theory, hence he defends a moral theory
grounded solely on the relational norm of harmony qua identity
and solidarity, which he construes in terms of friendship. It is for
this reason that Metz avers that ‘The idea that interpersonal rela-
tionships of some kinds have basic moral status is not often found
in Anglo-American or Continental normative theory’ (333). And,
taking seriously the idea that some interpersonal relationship is a
basic carrier of value emphatically captures the distinction between
the fact that ‘one might morally value something about people as
they are in themselves or as being part of certain relationships’
(333). So, here Metz insists on the dichotomy between valuing the
individual on the basis of some facts about her and valuing the
individual on the basis of facts of the relationship she is in. And,
Metz is unequivocal that his African relational moral theory
explains right actions by specifically focusing on considerations of
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relationships the individual is in and not the individual herself in
her own right. 
On the first individualist (moral) logic, if one asks ‘Why do you
save this drowning child?’, the response will invoke some facts
related to the child herself, be it welfare, dignity or rights (Keller
2013; Metz 2013a). On the communitarian (moral) logic, one will
adduce facts about the relationships she is in: she is my daughter,
neighbour and so on. It is on the basis of this dichotomy that I sub-
mit that Metz’s moral theory is susceptible to the focus problem
because it has the same features that a relationship-based justifica-
tion of partiality has (Keller 2013). To demonstrate the focus prob-
lem with regard to Metz’s moral theory, I consider an objection he
makes against a principle of right action derived from the moral
notion of ‘personhood’ in African philosophy, which makes it the
agent’s chief moral goal to realise her true humanity (Metz 2007a).
Metz offers what I consider to be some version of the focus problem
as a criticism to this self-realisation moral theory qua personhood. 
A self-realisation theory locates the ultimate value in some inter-
nal feature of a moral agent, some facet of her humanity; and, the
sole moral good on this theory is a function of perfecting one’s own
humanity. So, the reason informing the agent’s actions is the fact
that she will benefit from these actions by way of perfecting herself.
Metz, on his part, ‘questions the (self-realisation) theory’s ability to
provide an attractive explanation’ for why we should help others
(332). And, he observes that this theory is stuck with a ‘basic justi-
ficatory reason’ for helping others that is grounded in the fact that
‘it will help me by making me […] a better person’ (ibid.).
In his analysis, Metz correctly submits that a more promising
‘explanation’ should invoke ‘the fact that it would (likely) be good
for them, an explanation that a self-realisation ethic by definition
cannot invoke’ (ibid.). So, the crux of Metz’s criticism amounts to
the view that we should be able morally to respond (offering help) to
others merely because it is good for them. Their well-being should
have some place in morality even when we do not stand to benefit,
particularly where no greater sacrifice is involved. The underlying
logic is that there is something attractive about altruism insofar as
we act merely to advance others’ interests/welfare because it is good
for them; and, a theory that is essentially agent-centred like a self-
realisation account will not be able to accommodate this (other) indi-
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vidual-centred facet of altruism (Metz 2013a: 81). Metz ultimately
jettisons a self-realisation moral theory for its intransigent self-focus
since this feature generally renders it unable properly to focus on
others for their own sakes; and, as such, he considers it to be unat-
tractive to ground a plausible African moral theory. 
From the above, we can make the following observations. First, it
can be observed that a robust or even a plausible moral theory must
be able to capture crucial features of an individual qua individual
insofar as an individual ought to be the proper focus of our help
rather than the helper, particularly in cases where altruism is under
consideration. So, the reason for helping has to involve some facts
about the individual being helped. Thus, if Metz’s theory is to be
plausible, at the very least, it should also have this feature of rele-
vantly focusing on individuals for their own sakes. This strikes me
as the essence of the spirit of altruism. Second, this consideration of
individual-based facts is enough to cast doubt on the plausibility of
a theory that does not have the theoretical corpus to account for
proper focus on the individual for her own sake.
What justificatory explanation will Metz’s moral theory invoke
to account for helping my drowning daughter? Will this theory be
able to focus properly on the individual for her own sake? I do not
think so. So, the key question here is: do I focus on my daughter
herself as an individual or do I focus on the parent-daughter rela-
tionship as the basic explanatory basis for my action? Harmony
comprises of the relationships of identity and solidarity. Metz’s the-
ory appears to point us to the odd direction of focusing on facts
about the parent–daughter relationship itself rather than merely on
my daughter herself as an individual. I say so because the right
action according to Metz is a function solely of prizing the most
attractive relationships constituted by identity and solidarity; and,
not directly prizing the individual person herself. I think this differ-
ence may be clarified by comparing Metz’s African relational the-
ory against Western individualist theories. Metz’s own comments
with regard to his own relational theory and Kant’s deontology and
utilitarianism as principles of right actions are quite revealing:
Permissible acts […] are a function of participating in certain kinds of
desirable relationships […] The ultimate explanation of why a particular
action is wrong, or why one has moral reason to avoid performing a
certain act, involves a failure to relate. Such a perspective differs from
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utilitarianism, in which moral value is a function of the individual’s
capacity for pleasure and pain, and from Kantianism, in which it is a
matter of the individual’s capacity for autonomy. Of course, insofar as
utilitarianism and Kantianism prescribe certain actions, they often
require an agent to treat others in certain ways. The point is that, for
these views, treating others rightly is a function of responding to some-
thing good that is intrinsic to an individual, either her pleasure or auton-
omy (2013a: 82; emphasis added).
So, Metz is clear that his moral theory explains rightness and
wrongness in terms of successful or failure to relate; and, emphasis
is put on the activity of relating as the defining feature of morality;
whereas Kant’s deontology and utilitarianism are focused on con-
sidering some capacity intrinsic to an individual of a person like
pleasure or autonomy as the basis for determining rightness or
wrongness of actions. 
We can actually separate these two relationships of identity and
solidarity to demonstrate how it is in the basic make-up of this the-
ory to focus essentially on relationships as taking priority rather
than individuals qua individuals. I start with the requirement to
prize a relationship of identity. To prize a relationship of identity
amounts to seeing my personal identity in terms of ‘we’ or a ‘com-
mon sense of self’, where the ‘we’ includes me and others with
whom I am enveloped in a relationship (331); so much so that when
I refer to myself I use ‘we’ as if to suggest that the ‘we’ takes pri-
ority over the ‘I’. Furthermore, to prize identity also involves think-
ing of projects in terms of our projects and also working together
to achieve such shared projects. Here, we see that this relationship
of identity really defines me (personal identity) and my entire life-
plan in terms of relationships with others. So, a right action is
essentially characterised by this feature of ‘beingness-with-others’
(Menkiti 2004: 324). 
It is crucial to note that this aspect (identity) of this deontological
theory is very important since it caters for the communitarian aspect
of African moral thought, where I think of myself as ‘inextricably
bound’ with others or the idea that ‘I am because we are’ (Mbiti
1969: 141; Tutu 1999: 35). Why does Metz insist on this feature of
identity? It is because it offers his theory an ‘African pedigree’ –
remember he is after an African moral theory (324, 340). If he loses
this feature, he remains with just a moral theory. 
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The second relationship to prize is that of solidarity, which
imposes on me duties to care for others’ welfare for their own sakes:
to be sympathetic, loving and caring towards them in their own right
as individuals (Metz 2007a). One might here hastily suppose that
this facet of the theory solves the focus problem since it calls on us
to care for others for their own sakes as individuals. 
Nothing could be further from the truth. We should remember
that according to this theory, fundamental moral value is constituted
by these two relationships of identity and solidarity together (337).
So, the solidarity facet essentially requires the identity element.
One usually unnoticed implication of this principle of right action
is that a right action is one that is simultaneously characterised by
‘being-with-others’ (identity) and improving others’ well-being
(solidarity). In other words, a relationship of merely improving oth-
ers’ welfare, on its own, does not quite count as a right action; and
the relationship of merely ‘being-with-others’ also does not count
as right action. Without any of the two, one does not yet have the
right action. 
The focus problem emerges precisely because of the identity facet
of this moral theory. If one were to rank identity and solidarity in
terms of priority, Metz informs us that solidarity will rank higher
than identity: ‘While good-will (solidarity) without shared identity
is morally more valuable than the converse, it is better still with
shared identity’ (337). In other words, showing sympathy (solidar-
ity) to a stranger is less moral than doing so ‘to mutually recognising
members of a group’ – identity (ibid.). Since we cannot separate
identity from solidarity, it surely follows that the focus problem is
structured in this marriage of these two relationships. I say it is
‘structured’ because the identity aspect of this theory always locks
me in a relationship with others, where I see myself and others as
inextricably bound in a reciprocal we; and, thus it becomes impos-
sible to see the other merely as an individual qua individual, where
morality is concerned. 
Think about it this way. Take the case of my drowning daughter.
In scenario 1: the parent can save her own daughter; and, in scenario
2, a stranger can save my daughter. If the stranger saves her rather
than the parent, it does not yet account (properly) as a right action
because it lacks the facet of ‘mutually recognising members’ cap-
tured by the idea of identity. If the parent saves her then we have a
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(proper) right action because we have an instantiation of both mutu-
ally recognising members qua parent–child relationship and soli-
darity. So, it is the facet of identity that explains the focus problem
of Metz’s theory. 
Think about it differently. It seems that common-sense morality,
in the case of the drowning child, ought to instruct us merely to con-
cern ourselves with saving the child. Who does the saving should
not be important at all because our focus is the individual (child)
and to make sure she is safe. But, not so with Metz’s theory.
Whether it is a stranger or the parent that does the saving makes all
the (moral) difference in the world. The action of saving the child
by the stranger since it lacks identity does not yet count as a right
action; and, the action of saving the child by the parent does count
as a right action because it has both the identity and solidarity facets.
So, the idea of identity makes all the (moral) difference in account-
ing for the right action. 
One might here argue that I construe the identity relationship in a
very uncharitable or even narrow sense; and, this presents Metz’s
moral theory in an implausible light. No, I think the problem is not
so much my interpretation but the nature of the relationship-based
moral theory itself. Metz is very specific about what he has in mind
when he talks about relationships of identity. Above, I quoted him
talking about a mutually recognising relationship. One is called a
‘stranger’ precisely because there is no property of mutual recogni-
tion. A person like Mother Teresa who commits herself to helping
the poor world over is not having an identity relationship with the
poor she is helping, at least not in the sense employed by Metz. The
fact that she departs from the point of view where she and the poor
are the children of God is too broad to capture the precise sense of
identity Metz has in mind. 
To approximate the precise sense Metz has in mind, one has to
consider analogies he employs to reveal the true nature and scope of
this relationship. He uses the idea of ‘family’, as is common in
African thought; he also uses the idea of ‘love’ and he ultimately
reduces these relationships to the idea of ‘friendship’ (337; Metz
2009: 51–52). One feature that captures the precise sense of the idea
of family, love and friendship is that they are ‘anti-universal’ in the
sense that they do not include everyone in that relationship, in the
way the idea of everyone being a child of God does (Appiah 1998).
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Not everyone can properly count as your family member, your loved
one and your friend. These values capture the idea of partiality,
wherein there are those that are special (mutually recognising) and
those that are not (outside of this relationship).
So, a correct understanding of identity must understand it in this
precise sense wherein it espouses values that operate within the
framework of partialism rather than universalism as Mother
Teresa’s case would suggest. This reading of Metz is not surprising
because it coheres with one of the crucial moral intuitions of
African moral thought: the idea that ‘charity must begin at home’
(Metz 2013a: 83; Wiredu 1992: 200). So, the focus problem objec-
tion is effective against Metz’s theory because a right action essen-
tially depends on the relationship that holds between individuals in
the first place. This relationship (of identity) is essential even for
some action to count as right in the first place. 
I proceed in the last section to capture briefly what I call the
‘agent-centred partiality objection’; this criticism is also centred on
the idea of identity. 
Agent-related Partiality Objection 
One of the attractive features, according to Metz, of his moral the-
ory is that it can accommodate the idea of partiality in African moral
thought – the idea that charity begins at home (Metz 2009, 2013a;
Wiredu 1992). Bell and Metz (2011: 88) state: ‘Both Confucianism
and Ubuntu defend the value of partiality: our ethical obligations, at
least with regard to beneficence, are strongest to those with whom
we have personal relationships, and they diminish in intensity the
farther we go from those relationships.’ But, one can draw a dis-
tinction between two types of partialisms, one that is other-centred
and one that is agent-centred (Molefe, 2018). The ‘other-centred’
partiality usually refers to our special relationships with our loved
ones, mainly our friends and family (Cottingham 1986: 368). An
‘agent-centred’ partiality refers to the favouritism an agent ought to
manifest towards herself, her identity and projects (Cottingham
1986: 364). My objection here to Metz’s theory is that it does
appear to accommodate other-centred partiality since it values cer-
tain interpersonal relationships as morally fundamental; but, it does
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not appear to have the moral resources to account for an agent-
related partiality.9
So, the objection above was that the identity dimension render
this moral theory unable to focus on the individual herself for her
own sake; the moral patient must first be in a relationship with the
agent, then we can properly or sufficiently talk about morality. The
objection here is that the dimension of identity renders this moral
theory unable to prioritise the agent and her own projects in moral-
ity. To unfold my case, I will appeal to these two examples. 
Suppose I have some money to fund my own doctoral studies,
but I have a friend who needs money to pursue her first academic
qualification. Suppose it is really my life-project to become a
philosopher and to live my life contributing to the community of
philosophy. And, my friend for one reason or another also needs this
qualification. How do I decide where to plough the funds: on my
studies or hers?
Remember, in Metz’s theory, right actions are characterised by
the dual features of identity (being-with-others) and solidarity. The
act of prioritising my own project of being a philosopher appears to
lack the feature of identity. This act appears to be focusing on me as
an agent and not others. The act of helping a friend appears to have
both features of identity and solidarity; we are mutually recognising
and I do wish well for my friend. It appears then that the right thing
to do, in this instance, is prioritising my friend over myself. This
other-regarding facet of Metz’s moral theory, on the face of it, might
appear as a virtue but it is actually a limitation. 
A defence of Metz that my project of doing my doctoral studies
does have the element of identity since I will be joining the commu-
nity of philosophers does not work. This kind of defence does not
quite take off given that Metz explicitly informs us that ‘for the
African tradition, one’s own, existing relationships have a priority
relative to others’ relationships and relationships that one could have
but does not yet’ (2013b: 83; see also 2009: 52). In this case, the
extant friendship takes priority over the newer or potential future
relationships with philosophers. 
For another useful example, suppose, using some moral calculus
I stipulate, I discover that leading the life of a bachelor will make
my life more fulfilling than a married one. This example is useful
because, remember, Metz informs us that one of the salient moral
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intuitions in African moral thought is the idea that ‘Many African
people think there is some strong moral reason to extend familial
relationships by finding a (heterosexual) spouse and having chil-
dren’ (327). If Metz’s relational moral theory is true, then which
sort of life ought I to choose between these two, supposing a more
fulfilling life is a worthwhile goal of any plausible moral theory? 
In spite of the facts on the table that an unmarried life would work
out better for me as an agent than a married one, it appears that
Metz’s moral theory would prescribe a married life. An unmarried
life does not have the feature of being-with-others and solidarity but
a married one does have these crucial relational moral properties.
This example is not a farfetched one because it is possible to live a
miserable or less fulfilling married life and it is possible to lead a
more fulfilling solitary life pursuing art or something. The point of
the objection is to show that a relationship-based moral theory cannot
prioritise the agent and her own projects, particularly ones that are
just about her and have no obvious bearing for others, such as pursu-
ing art that one never shares with anyone. 
I do not here defend agent-centred partialism per se. I work on
the intuition that it should be a plausible feature of any robust moral
theory. At the heart of this kind of partiality is the robust moral idea
of me and things that come to identify me insofar as they pick me
out as distinct and special (Cottingham 1991). The idea here is to
observe that a robust moral theory must come to terms with the fact
that ‘specialness of a self […] has an important place in any plausi-
ble’ moral account (Cottingham 1991: 799, 800). What captures this
specialness is the fact that in my ‘scale of values’ I rank my life and
its projects to be prior and higher than even relationships, though
some relationships are part of my core commitments (Cottingham
1983: 87). And, if someone were to ask me why I care about these
relationships, a plausible moral response will not merely invoke
relationships themselves; but, I submit it has to invoke that impor-
tant feature of agent-relative reasons: the mere fact that they are
mine or that they are good for me (Appiah 1998). Also, a relation-
ship-based theory by its very nature does not have the corpus to
account for such an agent-related facet of morality.
The major concern then against this moral theory is that its focus
on being-with-others leaves the place of the ‘I’ unexplained in moral
theory. How does one choose in the case where there is a competition
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between the ‘we’ and ‘I’ as captured in the examples above? Which
projects are to be prioritised – those of ‘we’ or ‘I’ – in cases where
they diverge? It strikes me as disingenuous not to imagine such diver-
gences precisely because one of the perennial debates in Afro-com-
munitarianism is just this ever-present tension or even competing
claims of individuals and those of the community. What is interesting
about Metz’s moral theory is that it does talk about projects involv-
ing mutually recognising members; but what is exceedingly concern-
ing about it is its absolute silence on personal projects that are
concerned purely about me and their place in moral thought. 
Another useful way to capture this objection is in terms of
Kwame Gyekye’s critique to the so-called ‘radical communitarian-
ism’. One way to make sense of Gyekye’s (1992) critique is that
radical communitarianism is too focused on relationships to the
exclusion of the crucial moral features pertinent to the individual
and her own good; and, also it overlooks the possibility that some of
these individual issues and goods may have nothing to do with the
community in an essential fashion. On his part, Gyekye (1992)
defends ‘moderate communitarianism’ as it equalises some inter-
personal relationships and some individual goods. The upshot of
such a project is that it allows that ‘from time to time (I) can take a
distanced view of communal values and practices and reassess or
revise them. This possibility implies that the (I) can set some of
(my) own goals and, in this way, participate in the determination or
definition of (my) own identity’ (Gyekye 1992: 113). 
The insight from Gyekye’s complaint from grounding morality
purely in terms of relationships without allowing for some individ-
ual projects is that it denies one crucial attribute of human beings
that any robust moral theory must accommodate – the idea of auton-
omy and even that of authenticity (Gyekye 1992; Tshivhase 2013).
Morality must allow individuals some space to determine who they
are in that fundamental sense of ‘I’; it must allow me space to
answer that crucial question of why I think I am here and it must
allow me to think about how I want to live my life, by way of setting
some of my own goals (moral and non-moral) – all this without
denying the importance of relationships. The point is not so much
to rule out relationships but to critique the role they are made to
play in this moral theory. The underlying insight from this idea of
autonomy and authenticity is that it posits the self as a possible locus
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or even a source of morality, rather than the interpersonal relation-
ships, important as they might be. Or, more moderately, it strongly
points out that relationships cannot be the whole story about moral-
ity though they are an important part of it.10
This insight about some space for an individual and her own pro-
jects as occupying a special place in morality is best captured by
John Cottingham and he refers to it as ‘anthropodicy’. He refers to
this as an ‘ethics of self-concern’, whereas for Metz morality is a
morality of other concern (1991: 798). The crucial feature of this
position is that we must reckon with the fact that some ineliminable
degree of self-preference is inevitable in morality (1991: 802). Cot-
tingham uses the notion of ‘self-preference’ to include loved ones
like friends and family (ibid.). The insight here is that some portion
of morality must concern itself with the agent and her projects,
which includes relationships. The idea of ‘autonomy’ as I use it here
is to see an agent in her own right and as distinct though not neces-
sarily opposed to others. This self-preference is crucial but not 
all-encompassing – there are times when I may overlook some
agent-related projects. But, it is a general principle that these char-
acterise my day-to-day activities, otherwise me as a project would
be seriously threatened. 
If this idea of agent-related partiality matters at all in moral the-
ory, as I think it does, it is not entirely clear how a moral theory like
that of Metz can accommodate it. What makes this objection strong
is that it puts the cart where it belongs, behind the horse. Though
relationships matter morally and we should prize them, we should
prize them as a function of an individual or part of an individual,
not necessarily for their own sake. To express this point clearly, it is
not so much that Metz’s theory will not accommodate an agent-
related partiality; were it to be able to do so, it would do so for
wrong reasons. Such a partiality would be admissible only insofar
as it would ultimately contribute to the final value of interpersonal
relationships of identity and solidarity. However, I think this com-
pletely misses the point: the idea is that some moral good is a func-
tion purely of some individual interests or welfare, and relationships
matter insofar as they are part of what constitute my projects, inter-
ests and welfare, not as an end in themselves. 
My point is not so much to argue for autonomy as the basic norm
to ground morality, but merely to indicate that a robust moral theory
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has to reckon with some goods that reside in the agent and her own
good without regard to relationships. The fact of being an individual
gives her some obligations to herself as an agent and to make sense
of her own life. A robust moral theory must be able to account for
such individual goods; and it appears that a morality of relationships
such as Metz’s does not have the corpus to accommodate them. 
Conclusion
Above, I offered two objections to Metz’s African relational moral
theory that instructs moral agents to respect relationships of identity
and solidarity. I first objected by appeal to what is referred to as the
focus problem, namely if the basic good is some relationship then it
is not clear that this theory is able to focus properly on the individual
herself. Second, I argued that this theory does not have a place for
agent-related partiality. The legitimate place for self-preference and
one’s independent goal does not appear to have space in this moral
theory. I think Metz is correct to observe that some interpersonal
relationships are crucial in African moral theory, I just think he over-
states their importance in moral philosophy by according them the
final value status. A robust moral theory will have some crucial
considerations for the ‘I’ and her own projects. I think a promising
moral theory is one Metz identified as ‘probably the dominant inter-
pretation of African ethics in the literature’, one that is rooted in the
normative notion of ‘personhood’ (331). It appears to have inter alia
features that Metz’s moral account does not have.
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Notes
1.   Henceforth all pages for this article appear on their own in parenthesis.
2.   An ‘individualist’ moral theory is one that defines a right action by appealing
to some feature internal to a human individual like welfare, on the part of util-
itarianism, or, rationality, on the part of Kant’s deontology (331).
3.   Metz identifies at least six attempts to account for a plausible conception of
African ethics. Metz finds the following basic norms in the characterisation of
African ethics in the literature, namely: dignity, utility, self-realisation, survival
and harmony. Related to these basic norms, he specifies six principles of right
action (328–334). He ultimately defends an interpretation of African ethics
grounded in the relational norm of harmony.
4.   ‘Moral egoism’ is a moral theory that instructs a moral agent to pursue her
self-interest (Pojman 2002). This moral theory is more comparable to Aristo-
tle’s Eudaimonia (van Niekerk 2007).
5.   Those who are familiar with Metz’s moral theorisation will do well to remem-
ber that he seeks to defend a monistic theory, one that is grounded in a single
norm – such an account is either grounded in an individualistic or communi-
tarian norm. Metz articulates a theory that is purely grounded in a communi-
tarian norm. In this regard, Metz (2013a: 153; emphasis added) avers:
‘However, I am in the first instance interested in pursuing a monistic interpre-
tation of sub-Saharan ethics, mainly since one can know that more than one
basic end must be posited only upon first having posited a single one and hav-
ing found it inadequate’.
6.   I am equally aware that Metz does at times, particularly when he articulates
conceptions of dignity, offer interpretations of African ethics that construe in
terms of the capacity for relationship rather than the relationship itself (Metz
2010; 2012b). Metz is aware of this disjuncture between these two disparate
interpretations of African ethics: internalist and externalist interpretations of a
theory of right action. Metz notes these two possible interpretations of African
ethics. An internalist interpretation: ‘U: An act is right just insofar as it is a
way of living harmoniously or prizing communal relationships, ones in which
people identify with each other and exhibit solidarity with one another; other-
wise, an act is wrong’ (Metz 2010: 84). An externalist account: ‘U2: An act is
wrong (at least in part) because it degrades the individual’s dignity that she
has in virtue of her capacity to engage in harmonious relationships’ (Metz
2010: 94). Metz goes on to make this comment with regard to these two dis-
parate construals of African ethics: ‘I am as yet unsure of how U2 and U pre-
cisely relate to one another, specifically, of whether they are ultimately
equivalent, whether U2 is more fundamental than U, or whether they need to
be combined in some way’ (ibid.). This is evidence enough that Metz draws a
distinction between U, a principle that is externalist insofar as it defines right
actions strictly in terms of prizing some interpersonal relationships, and U2, a
principle that is internalist insofar as it defines right actions strictly in terms
of prizing some individual capacity. In this article, I limit my criticism to U
and I completely ignore considerations of U2 as my critique is reserved for his
relational ethics.
7.   An earlier statement of this principle was given in consequentialist terms,
wherein an agent was required to promote these relationships of harmony
(334). In this article, MacNaughton et al. distinguish between consequentialist
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and deontological theories in terms of promotion and honouring. Consequen-
tialism promotes some value, whereas deontological accounts honour some
value.
8.   This clarification is crucial to bear in mind about what we mean when we are
talking about relationships, since we are surrounded by them at every turn:
‘Most restrict their attention to (i) familial relationships and (ii) loving rela-
tionships (including friendship and romantic loving relationships)’ (Lord
2016: 574).
9.   I borrow this phrase from John Cottingham (1986).
10.   The objection that autonomy, for example, as feminists are wont to argue,
emerges in relational contexts is not strong enough to weaken the objection
made here. It is true others play a crucial role for one to be autonomous but
insofar as the agent is ultimately responsible for their actions then it follows
that there is that residual element that can be traced and tracked to the individ-
ual herself, otherwise we will not be able to account for personal responsibility
and accountability. 
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